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In 1974, under the sponsorship of the Social Science Research Council, a
committee was formed to assess the status of sociolegal research. The resulting
volume is described by its editors as "the product of a generation of scholars,"1
meaning that the contributors form a distinct cohort in the history of the field.
Indeed, it is important at the outset to place this volume in the context of the
development of the field of law and social science. During the nineteenth
century, American legal scholarship largely assumed that law was to be found
solely in the statute books and case reporters. In the first half of this century,
the American legal community gave greater consideration in briefs and books
alike to those elements of the social context of legal rulemaking made evident
by common sense and political realism. In contrast to either of these earlier
attitudes, the generation represented by this volume has emphasized empirical
research combined with direct application of the theoretical advances made in
a wide variety of social science disciplines. The results, as we shall see, have
been of debatable importance to both the parent disciplines and mainstream
legal practice, but two points of indisputable validity stand as a backdrop to
the contributors' discussions. First, legal scholars (and many of their students)
must now be literate in economics, legal history, and, to some extent, political
philosophy if they are to maintain credibility. Second, while legal scholars must
possess competence in the rhetoric of these disciplines, the uses made of them
by lawyers and the direction of those disciplines themselves show greater
divergence than common rhetoric might suggest. As a result, the present volume
is indeed, as the editors themselves say, one of assessment-at least through
the early 1980's 2 -but is itself in need of being assessed against the develop-
ment of its attendant disciplines.
Of course, since few can be expected to study from cover to cover a volume
of more than seven hundred pages of essays, a strategy of reading becomes
necessary. The volume may, perhaps, be usefully approached from the perspec-
tive of a consumer, the kind of consumer who wants utilitarian results as well
as broadened perspectives. Notwithstanding the usual temptation to rearrange
a casebook or set of readings as though there were no sound basis for the actual
organization of the book, the order of these essays is indeed of great value. As
they move back and forth from the general to the particular and from the
synoptic to the directional, the reader can gain a sense of where work of the
past decade provides an important supplement and find suggestions for where
additional ideas could lead us. A review of these essays thus provides an
occasion for delineating a brief guide for the consumer of sociolegal thought.
1. LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES I (L. Lipson & S. Wheeler eds. 1986) [hereinafter cited by page
number only].
2. The volume contains excellent bibliographies following each article, but almost all references are
to works published no later than 1983.
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II
In his reanalysis of evolutionary thought, Stephen Jay Gould has reminded
us of the central importance classification plays in scientific advancement
Taxonomies are not, he argues, an artifact of mindless pedantry, nor need they
be a thinly veiled attempt to convey a political or religious agenda. Rather they
serve to suggest connections among facially disparate entities and hence
underscore the commonality of processes that may be central to observable
variation. Sally Falk Moore articulates a similar goal when she sets forth a
typology in her essay Legal Systems of the World. Moore asks, in essence,
where shall similarities be posited among such disparate systems? If a biologist
were to group together all things with hairy legs, a category might be produced
that includes all rodents, some spiders and most people-a category of some
worth, perhaps, to a comedy writer, but one of uncertain value to a scientist.
Similarly, we could group legal systems according to their ability to maximize
economic rationality, to embrace semiautonomous domains within a single
overarching mechanism of control, or to further evolutionary potential by
channeling collective energy or multiplying options in the face of uncertain
pressures. But how would we know if the groupings we have chosen are
turning out to be like arthropods and vertebrates rather than hairy-legged
creatures or things that go bump in the night?
The answer, of course, has more to do with our theories and purposes than
with what is positivistically so. If, for example, we want to ask how it is
possible for law to develop in the absence of centralized control, then (with
great care for easily accepted stereotypes) we may wish to link the systems of
stateless societies in Africa or the Americas with contemporary institutions of
international law-and even attempt to see if some practical suggestions might
flow from such a linkage. If we want to think about how alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms can operate without balkanizing an otherwise unified
legal system, we may wish to group together the implicit psychology of an
African moot,4 the informality of a Jewish Conciliation Board of New York,'
and the factors that make Judge Wapner's audience accept his decisions as
legitimate.' In any case, if purpose guides typologies and if typologies reveal
the biases that inform their construction, rethinking taxonomic schemes provides
an opportunity for theory formation and an instrument for criticizing existing
theories. As an example, consider the role of the "primitive" in our legal think-
ing.
3. See generally S. GOULD, THE FLAMINGO'S SMILE 155-66, 199-211 (1985).
4. See Gibbs, The Kpelle Moot: A Therapeutic Model for the Informal Settlement of Disputes, 33
AFRICA 1 (1963).
5. . YAFFE, SO SUE ME! THE STORY OF A COMMUNITY COURT (1972).
6. See H. LEVIN, THE PEOPLE'S COURT: How TO TELL IT TO THE JUDGE (1985) (from cases adjudicated
by Judge Joseph A. Wapner).
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Throughout western legal thought-as in religion, morality, science, and
politics-the primitive stands as both a test and a supposed proof of our most
basic assumptions.7 At various times we have perceived primitive society and
primitive law as the stripped-down essence of fundamental humanity, as the
revealed failings of a species desperately in need of limiting institutions, or as
the testing ground for the clash of contradictory forces working their historic
way to our current social forms. In legal studies, primitive societies have
variously been used to argue that evolution occurs as much in social and legal
forms as in biological populations8 or that economic rationality must govern
all human actions if it governs even those of nonliterate communities.9 But
placing so-called primitive law at one end of a continuum and ourselves at the
other-even when it is to show how they form a single spectrum-misses the
very nature of variation and historical uncertainty.
Like post-Darwinian biologists, Moore grasps this fact quite clearly and is
trenchant in her criticism of essentialist schemes of every sort. Moreover, she
discusses how many contemporary social scientists continue to display a kind
of misplaced essentialism in their theoretical ideas even when they highlight
such elements as the structure of meaning in a given society. She is thus able
to show, for example, that Roberto Unger's typology of customary, bureaucrat-
ic, and legal orders presupposes a particular kind of tension between the real
and ideal in each category, a tension dictated far more by his concept of what
is essential to legal forms than by a demonstration that this is indeed the
predominant axis around which law and society are organized." Similarly, she
criticizes the universalism implicit in the work of Donald Black,11 Phillipe
Nonet and Philip Selznick,12 whose stress on governmental forms as determi-
native of legal forms is posited at so general a level that it is difficult to
pinpoint the actual mechanisms that are said to produce even the ideal types
they perceive in the world.
Moore is also well aware that biological evolution is a seductive model for
systemic legal change. After all, if humanity's way of conceptualizing experi-
ence in the absence of intuition is not itself embraced in our ways of ordering
activities and relating them to one another, why should society and culture not
respond to evolutionary forces? In the legal realm, such evolutionary thought
7. See generally S. DIAMOND, IN SEARCH OF THE PRIfflE: A CRITIQUE OF CLATION (1974);
G. STOCKING, VICrORIAN ANTHROPOLOGY (1987); M. TORGOVNICK, GONE PRIMITIVE: SAVAGE INTELLECTS,
MODERN LIVES (1990); THE WILD MAN WITHIN: AN IMAGE IN WESTERN THOUGHT FROM THE RENAIS-
SANCE TO ROMANTICISM (E. Dudley & M. Novak eds. 1972).
8. The central work in this tradition is H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1864). See generally P. STEIN, LEGAL
EVOLUTION: THE STORY OF AN IDEA (1980); A. WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW (1985); Elliott, The
Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 38 (1985).
9. See, e.g., Posner, A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to Law, 23 J.L. & ECON.
1(1980).
10. Pp. 46-49 (referring to R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCiTY (1976)).
11. D. BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW (1976).
12. P. NONET & P. SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION (1978).
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gives rise to propositions like that contained in Richard D. Schwartz's essay
on Law and Normative Order: "Law represents a response to the evolutionary
decline of normative consensus in complex societies."13 Note how this as-
sumes, rather stereotypically, a high degree of consensus in less complex
societies and a very tenuous consensus in complex societies.
Here, too, a generation gap may have opened up between scholars who
investigate the possibility of cultural evolution. For if one is to be serious about
sociolegal evolution one must ask whether there are processes in society
comparable to those of genetic drift, mutation, or genetic flow in biological
populations that propel the process of selection and adaptation, or whether
"evolution" is here only meant as a metaphor for growth, change, and develop-
ment of any sort.14 Schwartz himself had done much to prompt this issue with
his study of two Israeli settlements: the moshav, which possesses some private
property and uses a lawlike institution to govern its affairs, and the kibbutz,
which has only communal property and uses gossip and social pressure to
perform law's work.15 But until it can be shown that population growth and
institution building really are like biological forces, an analogy between legal
and biological evolution will remain dubious to many social scientists.
If evolution is not, however, a wholly appropriate model, the question would
seem to remain, as Schwartz suggests, in what ways shared norms can be
encouraged in the face of subcultural diversity. Here, more recent work in
philosophy and sociolinguistics suggests that relatively few symbols and
concepts need be shared to maintain reasonably peaceful social relations.16 It
is at least a serious question for research and theory, then, whether passing
acquaintance is not preferable to "normative order" in complex democracies.
One would then ask whether the ambiguities of jurors' decisions help by their
substantive indefiniteness to maintain social cohesion, or whether indeterminacy
in the law-regardless of its political implications-forges commonality by not
joining issues too precisely.1 7 Schwartz's suggestions as to how law can even
out power differentials and articulate common goals are well taken, however,
and indicate that, far from being solely a device for resolving differences, law
often serves as a vehicle for creating a sense that all the aspects of one's culture
cohere in an orderly way.
13. P. 63.
14. See, e.g., Blankenburg, The Poverty of Evolutionism: A Critique of Tuebner's Case for "Reflexive
Law", 18 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 273 (1984).
15. Schwartz, Social Factors in the Development of Legal Control: A Case Study of Two Israeli
Settlements, 63 YALE L. 471 (1954); see also Schwartz, Law in the Kibbutz: A Response to Professor
Shapiro, 10 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 439 (1976).
16. See, e.g., D. DAVMSON, ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS (1980); Rorty, The Contingency of
Language, London Rev. Books, Apr. 17, 1986, at 3, col. 1.
17. Legal indeterminacy has become one of the canons of the Critical Legal Studies movement. See
generally THE POLITrCs OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (D. Kairys ed. 1982); LegalStudies Symposium,
36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Kennedy & Klare, Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94 YALE LJ. 461
(1984). But cf. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. C. L. REV. 462
(1987).
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Perhaps the greatest challenge for social science and law posed in recent
years comes from the conjuncture of law and economics. Economics used to
be called the dismal science: it should, perhaps, more rightly be denominated
the dismal social science. Economics is a social science precisely because it
is at base a set of interpretations concerning the behavior of communities. But
notwithstanding Edmund W. Kitch's pleas to the contrary in his essay Law and
the Economic Order, economics retains a certain dismal quality by presuming
aspects of rationality that are not culturally informed and by positing concret-
ized abstractions that do not adequately account for the more indeterminate
nature of social and historical circumstances. No one can detract from the
impact economics has had on law in the years since Kitch's review was written,
but his warnings remain prescient even if the underlying sociology of knowl-
edge that has prompted lawyers to turn to economics remains to be written.
Marc Galanter's lengthy review of research on litigation states unequivocal-
ly that: "The most striking research findings about adjudication in contemporary
industrial societies can be summed up in the observation that full-blown
adjudication is rare, expensive, and avoided assiduously."" Such research
demonstrates, for example, that we were more litigious in earlier periods of our
history than we are now, that even for those who begin modest law suits one-
quarter simply drop out, and that many groups (particularly businesses) avoid
litigation because of its impact on their image as reliable trading partners.1 9
These findings also demonstrate that disputants actually operate within a wide
range of socially embedded choices and contexts: although litigation has
become more elaborate it has itself spawned greater movement toward media-
tion and negotiation, and although the promise of victory in a civil action
becomes financially more attractive, the allure of compromise in the face of
rising costs becomes more compelling.
At the same time, Galanter hints at a broader cultural context to litigation
when he says that: "The courts join in proliferating symbols of entitlement,
enlivening consciousness of rights and heightening our expectations of vindica-
tion."20 Indeed, the idea is quite dominant in our culture that if one has acted
in a certain way one is "entitled" to what flows from that behavior: if one is
a good spouse, or worker, or person it is not fair if one does not receive the
things that religion, morality, and the family as a miniature state have, in the
fashion of a social contract, promised in return. The shock to those involved
18. P. 182. See generally C. GREENHOUSE, PRAYING FOR JUSTICE: FAITH, ORDER, AND COMMUNITY
IN AN AMERICAN TOWN (1986); Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3 (1986);
Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About
Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4 (1983).
19. See generally Macaulay, Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures, and the Complexities of Contract,
11 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 507 (1977); Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A Preliminary Study,
28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963), S. MACAULAY, AN EMPIRICAL VIEW OF CONTRACT (University of Wisconsin
Law School, Disputes Processing Research Program Working Paper No. 1984-8, 1984).
20. P. 229.
[Vol. 100: 531
Law and the Social Sciences
in family law proceedings or small claims disputes that their cultural sense of
entitlement is not supported at law is often profound. Divorce lawyers, for
example, tell me that it is their educated, middle-class clients who have trouble
with the idea of no-fault divorce: poorer clients have no expectation that the
courts will speak to their sense of need or fairness or felt injury, whereas
middle-class clients expect emotional vindication and recognition of their just
due based on how their spouse has acted. As Lloyd Fallers said, the litigant's
quest for "the advantages of the narrow legalism of the forum while claiming
the sanction of moral holism '21 needs to be understood more fully in the
American context. For example, is it true in our broader cultural life that to
apologize is to show that one is indeed liable for recompense and that where
once apology may have canceled a certain debt to the other the courts have
become the repository of a Christian sense of blame and social obligation that
neither church nor community can any longer enforce through gossip, scandal,
and reinclusion? If so, litigation in its moral components and historic develop-
ment is only an element of a much larger cultural pattern to which law is
inextricably bound.
One clue to how people conceive of fairness, justice, and moral vindication
in a society is in the way they speak-the way in which disparate elements of
experience are embraced by a set of organizing categories. Few of the contribu-
tors to this volume mention the relation of language to law, in part because
much of the interesting work in this field has come since the volume was
composed.' David R. Mayhew's essay on Legislation is one of the few to
suggest that congressional styles of discourse and their attendant "cognitive
grooves" are not merely labels for advertising one's own position on an issue
but shape the terms of discussion that will follow. It is the great power of
courts to use words in such a way as to suggest relationships that others will
have to consider if they are to engage in the conversation.' Recent studies
have shown that women's styles of speech may make them appear less credible
as witnesses2 and that conceptual mistranslation may be at the heart of some
minority litigants' legal difficulties.35 But until lawyers fully appreciate that
language is not only a tool they use but a cultural artifact that subtly channels
21. P. 215 (quoting L. FALLERS, LAW wITHOUT PRECEDENT-. LEGAL IDEAS IN ACTION IN THE COURTS
OF COLONIAL BUSOGA 28 (1969)).
22. See, e.g., Conley & O'Barr, Hearing the Hidden Agenda: The Ethnographic Investigation of
Procedure, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 181 (1988); Danet, Language in the Legal Process, 14 LAW &
SOC'Y REV. 445 (1980); Sarat & Felstiner, Law and Social Relations: Vocabularies of Motive in Law-
yerlClient Interaction, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 737 (1988); Stone, From a Language Perspective, 90 YALE
L.. 1149 (1981); and references cited infra notes 24-25.
23. See, e.g., Rosen, Continuing the Conversation: Creationism, the Religion Clauses, and the Politics
of Culture, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 61.
24. W. O'BARR, LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE: LANGUAGE, POWER AND STRATEGY IN THE COURTROOM
(1982); Conley & O'Barr, Rules Versus Relationships in Small Claims Disputes, in CONFLICT TALK:
SOCIOLINGnSTIC INVESTIGATIONS OF ARGrUMET IN CONVERSATIONs 178 (A. Grinshaw ed. 1990).
25. See I. GUMPFRz, DISCoURSE STRATEGIES (1982); LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL IDENTITY (J. Gumperz
ed. 1982); Woo, The People v. Fumiko Kimura: But Which People?, 17 INT'L J. Soc. L. 403 (1989).
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matters to which they have not attended, the full impact of these linguistic
insights will not come home to bear on the legal profession.
If it is true, as Galanter argues, that we have shifted the workload of the
courts from civil to criminal matters, then we should expect social science to
have produced significant results in the criminal law domain. Jeffrey L. Jowell,
in his Implementation and Enforcement of Law, gives a brief overview of the
institutions of enforcement, but Jack Gibbs' essay on Punishment and Deter-
rence provides a more extended discussion of what social science has to say
about deterrence and punishment. Gibbs argues that in the 1970's the rehabilita-
tion model gave way to one of retribution, but not because of any research
findings on the effectiveness of one over the other. Indeed, no such persuasive
findings exist. Amile Durkheim's argument that punitive systems correlate with
a high degree of consensus and similarity of social tasks and Marx's theory that
punitive systems reflect class dominance are too broadly sketched to get us
back to the particularities of individual systems. Neither deterrence nor retribu-
tion doctrines can supply policy directions, Gibbs argues, because the range of
variables is so vast as to preclude unassailable conclusions. But of course, that
high a degree of scientific expectation has always misconceived the nature of
social science's potential contribution.
One key to understanding what social science can do may lie in the quota-
tion from Ludwig Wittgenstein that forms one of the headnotes to Galanter's
chapter: "Is it even always an advantage to replace an indistinct picture by a
sharp one? Isn't the indistinct one often exactly what we need?"27 If human
relationships are more like a cloud than a crystal, then one will fail to capture
the nature of momentary forms unless one captures the processes by which their
indistinct design serves to make new combinations possible and existing
relationships capable of being grasped. To get into the world of those we seek
to deter, to see the way they relate concept to action, could, if done in the light
of clearly considered theories, at least suggest how a cultural system informs
even a community of violence. The result, as in all sociolegal research, may
not be a clear program for action, but it can go very far toward understanding
the systemic repercussions that need to be considered when policies are brought
down to the local level.
The essays by Richard L. Abel on Lawyers, Stewart Macaulay on Private
Government, and Austin D. Sarat on Access to Justice form a coherent package,
notwithstanding significant differences in emphasis. Abel starts from the
position that occupations reflect the struggle for power among contending status
groups and that their systems of training and ways of mystifying the essential
serve primarily to sustain their control of the market for their services. Most
law firms know that a student is perfectly ready to be hired full-time after a
26. See pp. 275-80 (discussion of how language affects styles of legislation).
27. P. 151 (quoting L. WrroENMSEIN, PHILosoPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 71 (G. Simpson trans. 1958)).
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couple of years of law school, just as most third-year students know that law
school is two years squeezed into three. But Abel's perspective is that of the
school of Critical Legal Studies and thus carries certain additional implications.
In a careful analysis of the history of the American legal profession, he argues
that the legal profession has not simply responded to the forces of the market-
place but, rather, has increasingly sought to contrcl the market for its corporate
clients, only to find that lawyers have had to surrender any residual professional
ethos of their own to these very corporations in order to maintain the economic
well-being of their firms. Meanwhile, law students are led to believe that they
learned nothing before they arrived at law school, that all knowledge worth
possessing is contained within the four comers of the law school, and that if
only they appreciate that a legal education will finally teach them "how to
think" this knowledge will indeed be theirs. The result is an individual recapit-
ulation of an institutional imperative, the creation of a shared-but not really
independent-professional identity which, simply because it is shared, takes
on the air of objective truth.
Abel is the only contributor to this volume even to mention Critical Legal
Studies. He accepts the view that Critical Legal Studies stands on a higher
moral plane than other forms of analysis, and his final sentence sounds more
like a moral judgment than a piediction when he says: "Although the ideal of
professionalism undoubtedly will survive as an ever more anachronistic warrant
of legitimacy, the profession as an economic, social, and political institution
is moribund."' He does not refer to the debate stirred by the remarks made
a few years ago by Derek Bok, the former dean of Harvard Law School and
president of the University, who suggested that it was not in the nation's
interest for so many of the best and brightest to go into law since it is essential-
ly a nonproductive endeavor.29 Nor does Abel place the legal professions
among others to show how and why Americans have come to depend so much
on experts.
Abel's arguments about the legal profession are placed in relief by
Macaulay's assertion that private governments-by which he means organiza-
tions that establish and impose their own rules--mimic those of the state
government only to a limited degree. Whether it is a trade association, a
corporation's security operation, or a university disciplinary proceeding, such
private systems often rely on lawyers to help them keep state intrusion at a
distance. Macaulay questions Moore's argument that serniautonomous social
fields are terribly successful at fending off concerted state involvement, and he
rejects those broad-scale Marxist arguments that draw too sharp a distinction
between public and private institutions. Still, he makes some fascinating
28. P. 418.
29. Harvard's Bok Urges Changing "Expensive, Inefficient" Legal System, Seeks Law-School Curricu-
lum Reform, Chron. Higher Educ., May 4, 1983, at 8, col. 1.
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remarks that fit with those made earlier by Galanter ° about the tendency of
law to leave matters sufficiently ambiguous that the very process of engaging
in multiple interpretations can serve to hold a complex society together. He
does not, however, note that it may be at the level of procedure that the com-
mon link among multiple interpreters exists, or that a common narrative
style-a way of relating facts to one another and drawing a moral from
them-links even those who seem otherwise to be at loggerheads. Yet he is
able to show, through examples as widespread as clandestine housing activities
in Brazil and the hiring of women at American universities, that law does not
reside in separable domains of the public and the private but in a zone of
common influence and interpenetration.
3 1
Austin Sarat takes up the theme of shared procedures when he argues that
"[d]ue process not popular sovereignty is the governing ethos" in the United
States,32 that access to this process becomes the central issue for much politi-
cal argument, and that when those who are relatively disadvantaged engage in
disputes over access, "critique turns into affirmation, and threats to legal
legitimacy turn into support. '33 Indeed, studies of small claims courts" and
the portrayal of justice in the popular media35 show that in a great many cases
Americans want to have their day in court, to be heard and considered more
than to achieve a specified result. However, as social scientists learn more about
when and why people go to lawyers and courts, they will have to look beyond
the law to the cultural repertoire through which the style of a people's actions
fits with their broader sense of an orderly life.
The final two essays in the book take us more directly into the use of social
science in legal proceedings. Phoebe C. Ellsworth and Julius G. Getman's essay
Social Science in Legal Decision-Making offers a careful analysis of how and
why social science expertise tends to play a considerable role in criminal
proceedings and child custody but a rather slight one in labor law. The authors
rightly note that the tension between aggregate data and individual circumstance
often renders sociological data suspect to the law even though "social scientists
have not introduced probabilistic thinking into the legal system but have made
the probabilities explicit. '36 This came through quite clearly in the Supreme
Court's 1987 decision in McCleskey v. Kemp,37 in which Justice Powell,
30. Pp. 474-75.
31. Macaulay is also critical of the neo-evolutionary ideas of both Teubner and Klare who suggest that
the next stage of law is for self-regulation itself to become regulated. See pp. 492-502.
32. P. 527.
33. P. 529.
34. Merry & Silbey, What Do Plaintiff's Want?: Reexamining the Concept of Dispute, 9 JUST. SYS.
J. 151 (1984); O'Barr & Conley, Lay Expectations ofthe Civil Justice System, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 137
(1988); Tyler, What is Procedural Justice? Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal
Procedures, 22 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 103 (1988).
35. See Chase, Toward a Legal Theory of Popular Culture, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 527; Symposium:
Popular Legal Culture, 98 YALE L.. 1545 (1989).
36. P. 592.
37. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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writing for the majority, accepted the validity of the data showing that Blacks
are disproportionately given the death penalty but argued that such discrimina-
tion had not been shown in the instant case.38 Powell went on to suggest that
if sociological findings were allowed to support the challenge in this case,
Eighth Amendment attacks based on every conceivable social indicator could
bring the criminal justice system to a halt.39 As the authors of the very study
involved in McCleskey have pointed out, however, only relevant field studies
would be admissible, and most evidence on indicators other than race does not
lead to the conclusion that the system is fundamentally unfair.4
Social science findings bave, nevertheless, played a role in the formulation
of parole guidelines4 and, in more recent years, the selection of jurors,42 the
admissibility of evidence based on cognitive tests and psychosocial profiles,43
and the relevance of an accused's cultural background to the understanding of
his allegedly criminal act." By contrast, labor law has benefited very little
from such research. The authors attribute this to many reasons, including the
fact that behavioral assumptions are not as fully publicized in labor as in
criminal cases, that the criminal system is perceived as a failure needing help
from wherever it appears promising, and that facts must often take a backseat
to policy in the field of labor relations. To these reasons one might add that
those involved in labor relations usually assume they know what labor behavior
is like, that labor and management in fact share a great deal in their view of
what actually occurs in the workplace, and that institutions like the NLRB have
succeeded in convincing those parties and lawyers who come before them that
they will not necessarily suffer for accepting the dominant cultural myth about
what relationships in the workplace are really like. In our intensely individual-
istic society, we constantly turn to experts to address the circumstances of our
psychological and even moral stature, hence their great presence in criminal
and family matters. We question expert opinion concerning collective action
38. Id. at 292.
39. Id. at 314-19.
40. J. MONAHAN & L. WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 245 (2d ed. 1990)
(quoting Baldus, Woodworth & Pulaski, Law and Statistics in Conflict: Reflections on McCleskey v. Kemp,
in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW (D. Kagehiro and W. Laufer eds. in press)).
41. See, e.g., Carroll, Wiener, Coates, Galegher & Alibrio, Evaluation, Diagnosis, and Prediction in
Parole Decision Making, 17 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 199 (1982); Messinger, Berecochea, Rauma & Berk, The
Foundations of Parole in California, 19 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 69 (1985).
42. See McConahay, Mullin & Frederick, The Uses of Social Science in 7ials with Political andRacial
Overtones: The Trial of Joan Little, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205 (1977).
43. See, e.g., E. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TEsTIMONY (1979); Moore, Trial by Schema: Cognitive Filters
in the Courtroom, 37 UCLA L. REV. 273 (1989); materials on witnesses and psychological profiles in 3.
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because so much of our culture pulls us away from the collective to the individ-
ual: we deprive assassins of the significance of their social acts by rendering
them personally insane, and we distance ourselves from communal strife by
positing racial violence as interpersonal conflict. It may be necessary, therefore,
for social scientists who wish to have an impact on labor law to find a way of
describing the individual harm suffered in the workplace by litigants as the
direct result of the relations between categories of social actors rather than as
the result of interpersonal differences-a rhetoric that must avoid implications
of "class" differences if it is not to be condemned as socially divisive.
The acceptability of social research, of course, depends as well on the extent
to which it can associate itself with that other powerful legitimizing source in
our society: science. Although Shari Seidman Diamond's fine essay on Methods
for the Empirical Study of Law does not claim that such research need meet
the criteria of the pure sciences to have great value, her review does come to
the unsettling conclusion that every form of quantitative analysis used by the
social sciences has some flaw. Unidentified causes lurk in the most rigorous
analyses, tests may create the very factors they are meant to discern, and
measurements that have an air of extraordinary precision may mask crucial
uncertainties. The result, however, should not be despair or disdain any more
than it should be the avoidance of generalizations based on partial investigation.
To the contrary, what such limitations reveal is how much we must come back
to refining our theories about how law and social action, mediated by ordinary
discourse, create a highly textured entity into which the practitioner must move
with great sensitivity to the systemic repercussions that will result.
III
In assessing the value of sociolegal studies, then, one does well to remem-
ber that law is preeminently an artifact of culture: it is influenced by and
constitutive of the way in which the members of a society comprehend their
actions towards one another and infuse those actions with an air of immanent
and superordinate worth. When a social scientist attempts to comprehend the
ways in which such a community of meaning is integrated and moves through
time, she cannot afford to grant privileged status to any particular aspect of
culture in general. Instead, she must seek out the themes and emphases that any
given culture has played up and pose questions of connectedness relevant to
that culture's situation. The fact that there can, for example, be an anthropology
or sociology or psychology of anything does not mean that one must give in
to reductionism or universalism in order to say anything. It means, rather, that
these are fields whose very strength lies in their assumption that the various
aspects of a culture all have some bearing on one another, it is this systemic
orientation that can lead us to see connections we had not imagined and hence
potential repercussions we had not foreseen.
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This means, however, that law may be quite central or quite secondary
depending on the issue; one must follow the connections wherever they lead,
even if this means that ultimately law occupies only a comer of the larger
problem. If, for example, one wishes to understand how Americans assess a
process as fair or unfair, the legal manifestation of this may only be meaningful
if the way in which we structure multiple opinions in our political, sports, and
religious schemes of legitimacy is adequately understood. Law may matter, but
until the resonances among numerous domains have been sought out, the
centrality of any given institution cannot be presumed.
The lesson for sociolegal studies is thus twofold: first, that application is
not the test of an explanation's total worth and, second, that if one domain is
presumptively privileged over another, there is considerable risk of distorting
the investigation. The disappointment many judges and practitioners find with
social science data is partly attributable to the former; the paucity of sociolegal
studies' contributions to their home disciplines is substantially attributable to
the latter. Courts and lawyers may find a particular social science technique or
argument useful and may, in classic American litigation fashion, use it as a
basis for, or supplement to, a momentary result. But because its true utility is
as a heuristic device, as a mode of analysis that leads one to see connections,
exaggerating isolated features of sociolegal research can only lead to skepticism
and rejection when it fails to produce consistently believable results. It will fail
in this regard because the nature of the thing it studies only allows of perfect
steadiness if its very dynamism is denied.
Similarly, good social theory is unlikely to emerge from the context of a
law school environment because if one begins and ends with law as the critical
feature of a cultural issue, the nature of the connections involved will almost
always be distorted. In studying American manifestations of intent, fair compen-
sation, credibility, or intersubjectivity, it would be a major error not to consider
their manifestations in the law; but it would be no less crucial an error to
assume that the law is the best place to work on these issues. The failure of
law professors who work in the social sciences to produce theoretical contribu-
tions to their attendant disciplines is not due to the fact that lawyers work in
an applied area that cannot be expected to further its pure science-rather like
engineers who should not be faulted for failing to advance fundamental physics
or doctors the state of evolutionary theory. Legal scholars purport to be doing
basic research yet distort that-as pure research--each time they presuppose
the centrality of law. The sociology of legal knowledge-including everything
from professional training and expectations to the absence of peer review
publications-plays a role in this pattern. The result, however, should not be
a diminution of respect for the legal scholar's practical thought or an increase
in lawyers' "Ph.D. envy." Rather, it should yield a clearer sense of the way
labor has come to be divided between law scholar and social scientist and
should encourage greater freedom for each, as university faculty, to follow
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leads, even if they render their own discipline momentarily secondary. Only
then may a more realistic set of research objectives be formulated and more
realistic uses be made of social science in the lawyer's office and in the courts
themselves.
Ultimately, the essays in this volume show both the prospects and the
institutional barriers to the fullest understanding by law and social science of
one another's capabilities. As the very existence of this volume suggests,
however, it is possible that, if we start at home by understanding the social
context of our own production of knowledge, we will come to appreciate our
mutual concerns and potential in a way that will benefit both theory and
practice.
